TORN governance staking rewards

Ideas
#1

Governance is very important aspect of the project however there is an opportunity cost associated with locking TORN in governance. For example: rather than engage in governance an individual could instead provide liquidity to the Uniswap pool and earn TORN rewards. I understand that LPs have some impermanent loss risk. However, the point is that there are more efficient uses of capital than locking it in governance.

Those that carefully review and vote on proposals should be rewarded. The Tornado Cash community is essentially free riding off the work of these individuals.

Should we be providing an incentive for locking TORN in governance?

In the short-medium term this could be paid in TORN from the treasury. In the long term this could be funded through fees generated by the protocol.

5 Likes
#2

I am quite agree with you. With this kind of incentive, the community can let their torn in the governance pool and vote.
But I do think that we should put a vote quorum at 35k as TORN supply is rising.

1 Like
#3

Agree that there should be some incentive to offset locking and gas fees.

1 Like
#4

I think directly incentivizing voting rather then locking is a better idea, otherwise people will lock but avoid votes to save on fees.

4 Likes
#5

That makes sense. Could the incentive apply to voting AND delegation? i.e. no incentive for simply locking

#6

I agree on all of the above. We may want to start with the simplest possible short term solution and gradually increase the complexity of the incentivization system.

Phases could look like this: Reward on…

  • voting only
  • locking and voting
  • locking, voting and delegating
  • locking, voting and delegating; with voting giving higher rewards
1 Like
#7

Rewarding voting would give rise to “pseudo votes”, therefore ineffectively distorting the true consensus for any ballot.

#8

It wouldn’t be a concern in my opinion. Every voting has two options, rewarding incentives more community members contribute their opinions. How come it will be a pseudo vote?

#10

Well the problem is that it would attract external parties not vested in the best interest of the tornado community but only focused on generating a turnover from the process of voting (farming essentially), if such an incentive was in place.

These individuals wouldn’t care about the input, it would probably be randomized or consistent through automation in turn effecting the true consensus of any ballot.

#11

Thanks Amelie. The original plan was to leverage code from the SUSHI proposal. However, it Seems like the SUSHI proposal may take some time to implement. As far as I can tell this is the latest update.

@ethdev do you think it’s worth waiting for the SUHSI proposal to pass or could we implement something basic sooner for TORN?

#12

I could help to implement if needed. I work for 2 defi protocols.

1 Like